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TO INSTITUTE, TO PRIMALLY INSTITUTE
/STIFTEN, URSTIFTEN/
Husserl’s first readers and translators in France.
A possible origin of continental philosophy1
Zusammenfassung: In diesem Text wird die Bedeutung von Husserls phäno-
menologischen Forschungen zur (ursprünglichen) Institution und zur Institutionali-
sierung (neben den Verben “stiften” und “urstiften” verwendet Husserl die Nomen
“Stiftung”, “Urstiftung” und “Endstiftung”). Es wird angenommen, dass die Bedeu-
tung dieser nicht ausreichend bekannten Strategien nur in den unveröffentlichten
Handschriften gefunden werden kann, dass die unterschiedlichen Generationen der
Konsultanten von Husserls Archiven (in Leuven und Paris) eine identische Überzeu-
gung von der Bedeutung der Husserlschen Entdeckungen bezeugt, dass Mer-
leau-Pontys Übersetzung von Stiftung als “institution” dominiert und dass eben die-
se Übersetzung bewirkt hat, dass Husserl zu einer französischen Angelegenheit
wurde. Die Idee des Artikels ist, dass diese Theater der Lektüre, der Übersetzung und
des Einflusses Husserls die kontinentale Philosophie begründet. Das bedeutet, dass
Husserls Strategie der Stiftung/Urstiftung am Ursprung dieses Syntagmas liegen
kann, da das Denken einer Institution der Philosophie als Denken Europas struktu-
riert ist, als Denken von Menschheit und als Denken der Begegnung mit dem
Anderen (Intersubjektivität).
Stichworte: Institution, Institutionalisierung, Stiftung, Urstiftung, Archiv,
„Kontinentale Philosophie“.
In front of this esteemed institution and in one of the most im-
portant institutes of the institution of philosophy (I mean this semi-
nar, the hospitality and openness of the institution to invite, to do-
nate, to accept others, to generate and regenerate through others, but
also the institution’s ability to calculate and prepare to guard itself
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1 Èlanak je raðen u okviru nauènoistraivaèkog projekta Instituta za filozofiju
i društvenu teoriju u Beogradu Regionalni i evropski aspekti integrativnih procesa u
Srbiji: civilizacijske pretpostavke, stvarnost i izgledi za buduænost, koji finansira
Ministarstvo nauke i zaštite ivotne sredine Republike Srbije (br. 149031). Prva
verzija ovoga teksta prezentirana je 13. jula 2007. na University College u Dablinu.
from others and leave them on its threshold), I would like to present
some of the terms of my project. Within the title itself I immediately
specify three directions of research, and my task is to show the un-
conditional relation between them. The first part of the title concerns
a specific segment of Husserl’s phenomenological investigations:
apart from the verb stiften, urstiften or gestiftet, Husserl uses the
German nouns Stiftung, Urstiftung, Nachstiftung or Endstiftung.
Even today, despite the fact that there is still a great deal of time, be-
fore we can expect all of Husserl’s manuscripts to be published, it is
relatively easy to defend the importance of Husserl’s idea and the
importance that these, still strange, words have for Husserl’s work in
general. This importance is revealed in the second part of the title.
When the newly built archive opened its doors to its first visitors in
Leuven, before the Second World War (one of the first visitors being
Merleau-Ponty2) or right after the war (the first one certainly being
Paul Ricoeur), it was impossible to imagine the strength of Husserl’s
investment and insistence on the pair Stiftung/Urstiftung. The re-
sponsibility for concealing the uniqueness of these words is borne by
Emmanuel Lévinas, who translates the word Urstiftung in Cartesian
Meditations (1929) in two ways.3 Lévinas, who never worked in the
archive, could be a very good example of several possible supposi-
tions, (1) that the importance of Husserl’s “unknown” strategies can
only be found in unpublished manuscripts, (2) that completely dif-
ferent generations of users of Husserl’s archives (in Leuven or Paris)
witness an identical belief in the importance of Husserl’s discovery
(Derrida or Lyotard; Richir or perhaps Depraz), (3) that Mer-
leau-Ponty’s translation (Stiftung is institution) dominates and has a
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2 Merleau-Ponty visited Louvain for the first time on 1 April 1939 (he returned
in 1946). Of the many texts, he consulted Die Krisis, followed by a series of manu-
scripts marked D (primordiale Konstitution, Urkonstitution) which still remain unpub-
lished, etc. Cf . H. L. Van Breda, “Maurice Merleau-Ponty et les Archives-Husserl à
Louvain”, Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, No. 4, 1962, pp. 410-430.
3 In § 38 Lévinas and Gabrielle Pfeiffer (Alexandre Koyré examined this
translation) translate Urstiftung as “formation première”, and in the famous § 50 as
“création première”. E. Husserl, Méditation Cartésiennes. Introduction à la
phénoménologie, 1992 (1931), Vrin, Paris, p. 135, 181. Dorion Cairns always trans-
lates Urstiftung as “primal instituting”. Cartesian Meditations, Hague, Martinus
Nijhoff, 1969 (1931), p. 80, 111. When translating the word Stiftung, Cairns gives ad-
vantage to the word institution or instituting over the word foundation. Guide for
Translating Husserl, Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1973, p. 108.
bigger influence on the latter interpretations of Husserl than, for ex-
ample, Ricoeur’s first solutions of the translation4, (4) that precisely
the translation of Stiftung as institution, makes Husserl a purely
“French matter” not only because it comes directly from the archives
without any influence of German reception or German scholars, in-
corporates Husserl into the juridical and political milieu of France
and enables it to be interpreted from leftist and Marxist positions5
and finally, (5) (Ur)Stiftung as a (proto)institution, brings phenom-
enology into completely differing texts of important French philoso-
phers who haven’t read Husserl in the archive, but who then “with
him” necessarily think institution as such.6 This final point is sup-
posed to introduce the third part of the title which concerns the origin
of Continental Philosophy. The idea is that the reading, translating
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4 Ricoeur, immediately upon his arrival from Leuven with the first translation
of Husserl’s 1935 “Vienna Conference”, in his first text concerning Husserl “The
Sense of History,” from 1949, speaks of history as a most important moment in the
understanding of ourselves and cites § 15 of the book Crisis whose title is “Reflec-
tions on the Method of our Historical Considerations” :
“That sort of elucidation of history by which we return to ourselves in order to ques-
tion the original foundation /die Urstiftung; la fondation originelle in French original/
of the goals which connect the chain of the generations to come…, this elucidation, I
say, is only the authentic coming to awareness by the philosopher of the true end of
his willing, of what is willing in him, comes from willing, and is willing as such from
his spiritual ancestors.”
“I can know who I am, continues Ricoeur, through uncovering an origin /Ursprung/, a
primal institution /Urstiftung; une proto-fondation, in French/, which is also a project
toward the future horizon, a final institution /Endstiftung; une fondation finale/.” P.
Ricoeur, Husserl. An Analysis of his phenomenology, Evanston, Northwestern Univer-
sity Press, 1967, p. 155. Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 54 (1949), pp. 293-294.
After five years, in the text “Kant and Husserl”, Ricoeur precisely locates the place in
the Leuven archive where this, as he calls it, “l’interprétation idéaliste de la constitu-
tion” can be found.
“Hereafter, Husserl will look on the side of temporality for the secret of the constitu-
tion of all supposed being-in-self. Former evidences, destroying the movement of
constitution where they were primally instituted /Urstiftung; où elles sont nées
orginairement/, present themselves as a mysterious transcendence. The in-itself is the
past of evidence and the possibility of reactivation of it in a new present. An entire
group of manuscripts, Group C, struggles at the breach opened by the Third Medita-
tion.” P. Ricoeur, Husserl, p. 193.
5 A good example is the book La Phénoménologie (Paris, PUF, 1954) by
Jean-François Lyotard, which is under a great deal of influence by Ricoeur.
6 Here I am referring to Michel Foucault’s project. Cf. L’ordre du discours,
Paris, Gallimard, 1971, pp. 9-15.
and influence of Husserl, which began in his Belgian archive and
continued in Paris, can institute what we call “Continental Philoso-
phy”. This means that Husserl’s strategy with Stiftung/Urstiftung
can be the source of this syntagma “Continental Philosophy” be-
cause the thinking of the institution of philosophy (the question
“What is the institution of philosophy?” hides the fundamental ques-
tion “What is philosophy?”) is structured as the thinking of Europe,
as the thinking of humanity /Menschenheit/7 and as the thinking of
an encounter with the other (intersubjectivity, community).
Both Merleau-Ponty and Cairns translate the word Stiftung –
“the beautiful word of Stiftung /le beau mot de Stiftung/ whichHusserl
used to signify the infinite fecundity of every moment in time”8 – as
institution.9 What is therefore institution and does this Latin syntagma
– in statuere – truly carry over Husserl’s intention to find one opera-
tion or one formwhich differs from all the previous ones he used? It is
about a creative act which begins something, which provides stability
to something and which should differ from the words Begründung,
Letztbegründung, Konstitution, Setzung, Fundierung etc.
I will, preliminarily and without taking too long, list several
meanings of the word institution, which should be compared to Ed-
mund Husserl’s intentions: beyond giving a beginning to something
(to originate, to initiate; in French instituer means an act through
which something is inaugurated) and beyond building (establishing)
something on the land of the master (institution is always connected
to architecture, to an object), to institute shares the same semantic
line as the Latin word status. In statuere is to make something stand
up (without help, without holding it up, rather having it stand by it-
self) or hold itself up vertically.10 The institution secures its status
through statutes, that is, through internal rules (institutes). The sec-
238
PE
TA
R
BO
JA
N
IÆ
7 “Philosophy is the “innate entelechy” of Europe, the “proto-phenomenon”
of its culture.” P. Ricoeur, Husserl. An Analysis of his phenomenology, p. 152.
8 M. Merleau-Ponty, La Prose du monde, Paris, Gallimard, 1966, p. 95.
9 Dermot Moran, in the book Edmund Husserl. Founder of Phenomenology
(Cambridge, Polity, 2005), mentions the word Urstiftung seven times, and translates
it in four different ways (in the Index of this book Urstiftung is translated as founda-
tion). Urstiftung is the primal institution, primary instituting, primary founding and
primal foundation.
10 Therefore, in contrast to the word “foundation,” which assumes sitting and
the stability that sitting affords one (fundamentum is the back side, anus). Fund
means money.
ond, equally important corpus of the meaning and use of the verb to
institute, refers to the par excellence openness of an institution to: (1)
signify or create a successor (a deal between generations), (2) to insti-
tute means to give instruction, educate and (3) to institute presumes
the creation of a reserve or the creation of a place for something that
has yet to come, is forthcoming, and is still absent or invisible.
As I pointed out earlier, the phrase in statuere into which
Husserl’s idea is suppose to be translated and transformed,11 already
has a rich and fertile political-law tradition in France. Merleau-Pon-
ty, in his notes on the course “L’Institution dans l’histoire person-
nelle et publique” (1954-1955), points out that it is precisely, Hus-
serl, who through his pair Stiftung/Urstiftung, manages to find the
meaning of permanent revolution:
Revolution and institution: revolution is re-institution which
has as its goal to overthrow /renversement/ of the preceding
institution (…) Revolution is a return to the source, the awa-
kening of something that derails the founding idealizations,
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11 The colloquial meaning of Stifter is Founder; Anstifter is Initiator, while
Stiftung means a Foundation which provides stipends or grants for successful projects.
The other two celebrated cases of Husserl’s use of these words should only briefly be
mentioned: Heidegger’s “Die Ursprache aber ist die Dichtung als Stiftung des Seins”;
and Kant’s concerning peace which is necessarily established /Frieden stiften/. “Zum
ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf”, Kants gesammelte Schriften, Band
VIII, Berlin, Walter de Grunter & Co., 1923, S. 349. Only in the last decade of his life
does Kant frequently use the words stiften or gestiften. Stiften, without a doubt, implies
violence/force. Kant believes, and in many places clearly manifests (several times in
the notes on hismanuscripts) this belief, that something can be established, or rather in-
stitutionalized, through violence/force. That is to say that the act of violence/force is
the inaugural act of any establishing, including the establishing of peace. For example,
§ 55 Metaphysics of Moral begins with Kant’s hope that it is possible to establish a con-
dition that comes close to right, through war /um etwa einen dem rechtlichen sich
annähernden Zustand zu stiften/. In the lectures from the winter semester of 1793/94,
which were prepared for publication by Johann Friedrich Vigilantius (Metaphysik der
Sitten Vigilantius, Kant is quite distinct: “(…) because without violence right cannot be
established, therefore violence must precede right, instead of rule based on rights
founding force (strength/power). Take people in statu naturali, they are ex leges, apart
from legal status, without any law, only some outside force, keeping them asleep.”(…)
dass ohne Gewalt kein Recht gestiftet werden kann, so muss dem Recht die Gewalt
vorausgehen, statt dessen der Regel nach das Recht die Gewalt begründet muss. An
nehme Menschen in statu naturali, sie sind ex leges, in keinem rechtlichen Zustande,
sie haben keine Gesetze, noch äußerliche Gewalt, die sie aufrecht erhält. Kants
gesammelte Schriften, Band XXVII, Kants Vorlesungen Band IV, Vorlesungen über
Moralphilosophie, 2/1, Berlin, Walter de Grunter & Co., 1975, S. 515.
their context, the future which is the past, the future which is a
much deeper comprehension of the past, which is gestiftet /in-
stitué/ instituted thought this past in a dual way. The double
aspect of institution: it is itself and it is on the other side of it-
self, restriction and openness.12
But these sentences don’t contain only Merleau-Ponty polem-
ics with Sartre, another French phenomenologist, nor does he just
evoke old questions in connection with Marxism or Trotsky. During
a course in which he meticulously analyses Marx, Proust and Freud,
Merleau-Ponty strives to show the advantage of the word “institu-
tion” (“An institution is not the position of a concept, but of a being,
the openness of a field”13) in relation to law, contract or constitu-
tion.14 This is nothing else but the repeating of tradition: (1) while
listening to Merleau-Ponty we can hear Saint-Just’s celebrated calls
for the introduction of institutions into the Republic because they are
its soul;15 (2) when Merleau-Ponty speaks of a double aspect of insti-
tution he is in fact repeating Saint-Simon (the creator of the expres-
sion contre-institution “counter-institution” [1820]);16 (3) the rela-
tion of restriction and openness of the institution represents the de
facto convertible and incorporative power of the institution (within
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12 L’institution. La passivité. Notes de cours au Collège de France (1954-1955),
Paris, Belin, 2003, pp. 42-43.
13 Ibid., p. 101. “L’institution, c’est le figure.” Gilles Deleuze, Empirisme et
subjectivité, Paris, PUF, 1953, p. 39; English translation, p. 49.
14 This is Emile Durkheim’s position, but also that of French institutionalists
(Maruice Hauriou, Georges Renard, Joseph T. Delos), important jurists and
politicologists between the two wars. “The essence of society is not the law but rather
institution.” (Ibid., p. 35; p. 45) writes Deleuze in 1953. In this book about Hume,
Deleuze copies portions of his introduction to a book he edited the same year. This is
his first book Instincts et Institutions (Hachette, 1953) in which he collects 66 ex-
cerpts of different authors concerning institution.
15 “Les institutions, qui sont l’âme de la République, nous manquent.” “Dis-
course 26 February 1794”, Saint-Just, Discours et rapports, Paris, Messidor, 1988, p.
191. Alain Badiou begins his text “What is a philosophical institution?” (“Qu’est-ce
qu’une institution philosophique ? Ou : Adresse, transmission, inscription”, Condi-
tions, Paris, Seuil, 1992, pp. 83-90) with Saint-Just. On page 87, Badiou writes, but
we hear Husserl: “(…) the philosophical institution is not the guardian of philosophy,
rather it is the guardian of its historicity.”
16 One of Jacques Derrida last lectureswas “AModel of Philosophy as a Coun-
ter-Institution” (23 August 2002; S.I.E.C.L.E., Coloque de Cerisy, Paris, Editions de
l’IMEC, 2005, pp. 246-261.)
the institution consciousness (Bergson), custom, habitus, energy, in-
stinct are converted).17
In order to presently examine and explain institution of
(Ur)Stiftung into this complicated field covered by the words in
statuere and institution, in order to discover the strength of Husserl’s
intention and how far his opinion exceeds this context – simply put,
does introducing Husserl into French philosophy means to institute a
new (absolute) Urstifter18, Edmund Husserl, who then institutes not
just continental or analytical but also pure philosophy19 or the insti-
tution of philosophy as such? – I propose three different visions or
versions of Husserl’s intervention. Only the third one, which was
provoked by one of Ricoeur’s fragments, written more than 30 years
ago, could possibly justify my humble endeavor.
(1) Ingarden, in his 1967 Oslo lectures,20 insists that the gradu-
ally transformation of the word Setzung (position; setzen, to set up)
into Stiftung, signifies Husserl’s path towards idealism. Husserl sub-
stitutes the word Setzung (which can easily be found in Kant and Ne-
okantians) starting with Meditations and Formal and Transcendental
Logic, in order to reinforce the active strength of intentionality. Ideal-
ism is not to find one thing, or to accept and confirm its existence; ide-
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17 “Adrive is satisfied inside an institution. (…) In marriage, sexuality is satis-
fied; in property greed.” Deleuze, Empirisme et subjectivité, p. 37; p. 46.
18 The Frenchman Descartes is Urstifter (“the primal founder, not only of the
modern idea of objectivistic rationalism but also of the transcendental motif which
explodes it”). Cf. § 16 The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenom-
enology, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1970, p. 73; HUA, Band VI, S.
74. At the very end of his life Husserl differentiates between the absolute and relative
proto-institution (Document 33 “Die Unterscheidung zwischen absoluter und
relativer Urstiftung”, Sommer 1937). Cartesian’s intention is radical and absolute,
just as proto-institution of Greek philosophy (HUA, Band XXIX, S. 421-423).
19 In a document numbered 32 “Teleology in the History of Philosophy”
(”Teleologie in der Philosophiegeschichte”)written in 1936 and during June and July
of 1937, Husserl says:
“Die Methode, sie, die überrelativen Wahrheiten, zu finden, setzt mit voraus die
Methode der Reinhaltung des streng theoretischen Interesses, auf das philosophische
Wahrheit bezogen ist. Die Erfordernisse dieser doppelten Methode sind die Bedin-
gungen der Möglichkeit einer Philosophie – einer reinen Philosophie.” HUA, Band
XXIX, S. 393.
20 Lecture 4 (6 October 1967), R. Ingarden, Einführung in die
Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls: Osloer Vorlesungen 1967, Hrsg. von Gregor
Häfliger, Tübingen, Niemeyer, 1992.
alism is to create that one thing, to enable the revelation of its being,
the revelation of the thing itself. Ingarden points out that this is true in
some cases, for example when a university is instituted, when through
an act (stiften) the being of a university is uncovered. But what if a
thing is in question? Ingarden is pretty certain that, from 1929 Husserl
changes the form of every act of comprehension and introduces into it
a possibility to institute (stiften) something (in this way the transcen-
dental and intentional overlap as they area able to create).
(2) Another perspective weakens Husserl’s idealism if it ac-
cepts21 his insistence of the importance of history. Namely, there ex-
ists no order of the ideal (geometry is Husserl’s celebrated example)
which through language (written and spoken) doesn’t simulta-
neously secure its own objectivity and its own non-temporality. Lan-
guage is what constantly re-actualizes and once more completes
(Nachstiftung; reinstitution) what has already been originally insti-
tuted. However, this is precisely the fundamental paradox of every
Stiftung which Husserl insists upon: how come that something
which is at the beginning, which is potential, which is not present in
this actual act, how come that this first and potential implicit some-
thing is in every work and in the actual (Husserl calls this leistend in
act)? Three questions: “how does every Stiftung renew and repeat
Urstiftung?”, “how is it that Urstiftung is in every Stiftung?” and
“how is it that the future is anticipated within the telos of a proto-act
(Endstiftung is already in Urstiftung22)”? – open the door to a series
of famous questions: how are possible potential, reserve, delay, sur-
plus etc.?23 One more thing: during the reoccurrence of the proto-in-
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21 “Here the concept of institution is seen as a remedy /un rémede/ for difficul-
ties of the philosophy of consciousness.” “Here the development of phenomenology
into metaphysics of history will be prepared.” Résumés de cours. Collège de France
1952-1960, Paris Gallimard, 1968, p. 59, 65.
Marc Richir calls Merleau-Ponty (as well as Derrida’s) interpretation of Husserl
more readily metaphysical than phenomenological, despite the fact that the meta-
physical has a phenomenological “inspiration”. “La Phénoménologie de Husserl
dans la philosophie de Merleau-Ponty. Question phénoménologiques”, Philosopher
en français, ed. J-F. Mattéi, Paris, PUF, 2001, p. 192.
22 L’institution. La passivité. Notes de cours au Collège de France (1954-1955),
p. 92. J. Derrida, Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry : An Introduction, New York,
N. Hays and Harvester Press, 1989, pp. 138, 141; French original, pp. 149-151.
23 These are all questions which originated with the readings of Husserl’s
manuscripts and about which different philosophers have written in the past decades.
stitution /Urstiftung/ by every forthcoming Stiftung, language simul-
taneously opens a possible communal world in which I and another,
the past and the present, cross paths.
(3) The third interpretation of Husserl’s pair Stiftung/Ursti-
ftung, is provoked by a short excerpt, found on page 181 of the text
“The problemof the foundation ofmoral philosophy”, authored by the
long-time director of Husserl’s archive in Paris Paul Ricoeur.24 De-
spite not quotingHusserl, Ricoeur implicitlywrites byHusserl’s hand,
using a newly published manuscript.25 Not only does the existence of
this text refute Ingarden’s statement (and not only his) – Husserl wrote
about primal institution much earlier than 1929 – this text clearly con-
firms that Husserl’s thoughts about the community are at the begin-
ning of this adventure concerning the Stiftung. Ricoeur writes:
With institutions a new factor of passivity appears which is
compounded with the passivity of the self-actualization of
each person by himself and with the other passivity which cor-
responds to the initial intersubjective situation of inequality
which we never stop correcting. (…) I mean that we can only
act through structures of interaction which are already there
and which tend to unfold their own history which consists of
inertias and innovations which themselves are sedimented in
their turn. (…) I introduced the word institution here, continu-
es Ricoeur, because it seemed to me to respond to a double cri-
terion: On the one hand, every institution leads back to an
Urstftung – a primordial mythical founding – so that instituti-
on signifies that I am already within the instituted. (…) I am
never before the beginning of every institution, I am always in
an after-the-fact situation. A second indication is furnished by
243
FI
LO
ZO
FI
JA
ID
R
UŠ
TV
O
2/
20
07
24 This text, which has still not been published in French, was first released in
Italian in 1975. It was published in English in the journal Philosophy Today, 22: 3,
fall 1978, pp. 175-192.
25 In question is a manuscript numbered 28 “Problem: Transfer (Tradition) and
Urstiftung” /Übernahme und Urstiftung. Gedanken kollidieren nicht in der Intersub-
jektivität, aber Zwecke kollidieren eventuell/, E. Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie der
Intersubjektivität, Zweiter Teil: 1921-1928, HUA, Band 14, 1973, S. 222-225. Rico-
eur might not have recognized this manuscript, before it was published, probably be-
cause it was seen as not-classified. Iso Kern found that it belongs to manuscripts con-
cerning the community, it was written in the 20’s /zwanziger Jahre/, or more
precisely between 1921 and 1922.
the failure of every effort, phenomenological or otherwise, to
draw the social and the political from the immediate I-you re-
lation and, as a consequence, to do without neutral term. This
dream of immediacy, of face to face relations without the in-
termediary of a neutral term is well-known. It is the dream that
that dialogue should be the measure for every human relation.
But we also know that even the most intimate dialogical relati-
on is possible only on the basis of institution (…)
Apart from Emanuel Lévinas’s implicit critiques (now, it is
completely visible why Lévinas doesn’t mention Husserl’s (Ur)Stif-
tung anywhere), it seems to me that, already at this point, the task of
philosophy to institute, to generate and to regenerate the community,
is revealed. This is the beginning which ends with Husserl’s final
texts concerning the absolute and relative primal institution of the
institution of philosophy (or pure philosophy). The first task of phi-
losophy is not just, as Derrida wrote in 1954, “la réactivation de la
genèse” (the genesis of anything else outside of philosophy), but
also “la réactivation de SA genèse”.26 This task is one and the same.
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26 J. Derrida, “La première tâche de la philosophie: la réactivation de la genèse”,
Le problème de la genèse dans la philosophie de Husserl, Paris, PUF, 1990, p. 259. De-
spite being taken by the strength and beauty of Ricoeur’s first texts concerning Husserl,
Derrida translates the word Stiftung in a different way: “fondement originaire”.
Petar Bojaniæ
STIFTEN / URSTIFTEN I NJEGOVO PREVOÐENJE
Husserlovi prvi èitaoci i prevodioci u Fransuskoj.
Jedna moguæa geneza kontinentalne filozofije.
Saetak
U ovom tekstu se razmatra znaèaj Husserlovih fenomenoloških istraivanja
o (prvobitnoj) instituciji i institucionalizovanju (osim glagola stiften, urstiften ili ge-
stiftet Husserl upotrebljava nemaèke imenice Stiftung, Urstiftung ili Endstiftung).
Petpostavlja se da je vanost ovih Husserlovih nedovoljno poznatih „strategija“ mo-
gla da bude pronaðena jedino u neobjavljenim manuskriptima, da su razlièite genera-
cije konsultanata Husserlovih arhiva (u Luvenu ili Parizu) svedoèila identiènu veru u
znaèaj Husserlovih otkriæa, da Merleau-Pontyjeva verzija prevoda (Stiftung je insti-
tution) dominira i da upravo prevod reèi Stiftung sa institution, èini da „Husserl“
postane èisto „francuska stvar“. Ideja je da ovaj teatar èitanja, prevoðenja i uticaja
Husserla utemeljuje „kontinentalnu filozofiju“. To znaèi da Husserlova strategija sa
Stiftung/Urstiftung moe da bude u poreklu ove sintagme jer je mišljenje institucije
filozofije strukturirano kao mišljenje Evrope, kao mišljenje èoveènosti /Menschheit/
i kao mišljenje susreta sa drugim (intersubjektivnost).
Kljuène reèi: Institucija, institucionalizovati, Stiftung, Urstiftung, arhiv,
„kontinentalna filozofija“.
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